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Abstract 
 
There is a substantial literature which suggests that appraisals are smoothed and lag 
the true level of prices.  This study combines a qualitative interview survey of the 
leading fund manager/owners in the UK and their appraisers with a empirical study of 
the number of appraisals which change each month within the IPD Monthly Index. 
The paper concentrates on how the appraisal process operates for commercial real 
estate performance measurement purposes.  The survey interviews suggest that 
periodic appraisal services are consolidating in fewer firms and, within these major 
firms, appraisers adopt different approaches to changing appraisals on a period by 
period basis, with some wanting hard transaction evidence while others act on ‘softer’ 
signals.  The survey also indicates a seasonal effect with greater effort and 
information being applied to annual and quarterly appraisals than monthly.  The 
analysis of the appraisals within the IPD Monthly Index confirms this effect with 
around 5% more appraisals being moved at each quarter day than the other months.  
More November appraisals change than expected and this suggests that the increased 
information flows for the December end year appraisals are flowing through into 
earlier appraisals, especially as client/appraiser draft appraisal meetings for the 
December appraisals, a regular occurrence in the UK, can occur in November.  
January illustrates significantly less activity than other months, a seasonal effect after 
the exertions of the December appraisals. 
 
Key words: Appraisal smoothing, appraiser behaviour, real estate index. 
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Introduction 
 
In the absence of continuously traded and securitised markets and the lack of success in 
developing transaction-based indices, commercial property appraisals perform a vital 
function in the property market by acting as a surrogate for transaction prices.  As with asset 
prices in the equity and bond markets, property asset appraisals are central to the inter-
related processes of performance measurement, acquisition and disposal.  However, within 
both the professional and academic communities, there is considerable scepticism about 
their ability to fulfil this role in a completely reliable manner.  At the micro-level, there is a 
consensus that individual appraisals are prone to a degree of uncertainty.  At the macro-
level, it is clear that few analysts accept that appraisal-based indices reflect the true 
underlying performance of the property market.  It is commonly held that such indices fail to 
capture the extent of market volatility and tend to lag underlying performance.   
 
As a consequence, issues such as the level and nature of appraisal uncertainty, and the 
causes and extent of index smoothing have generated a substantial research literature and 
professional debate.  However, many of the issues remain controversial and unresolved.  
Whilst it is generally acknowledged that the nature of the process and the structure of the 
property market render appraisals prone to uncertainty, there is a growing recognition that 
appraiser behaviour and appraiser response to external influences may increase the 
likelihood of biased figures.  Additionally, it is clear there are often complex feedback 
processes occurring.  Appraisals, in turn, influence the behaviour of market important 
participants such as investors and financiers.  To date, the majority of research and 
commentary has taken little account of the market context in which appraisals are produced 
and used while seeking to explain observed consequences such as smoothing and lagging. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  The first section draws upon a literature 
review to explore the relationship between the observed characteristics of appraisal-based 
performance indices and the appraisal process.  This is followed by a discussion of the 
results of interview-based research into the process by and context in which appraisals are 
formed.  In the penultimate section, data from the Investment Property Databank on the 
levels of appraisal ‘stickiness’ is analysed.  The final section outlines the main conclusions of 
the research. 
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Appraisal formation 
 
In the real estate economics literature, the appraisal process is conventionally conceptualised 
as a procedure through which appraisers rationally process information on comparables to 
arrive at an estimate of current value.  At the same time, it has been recognised that the 
inevitably retrospective nature of this methodology will tend to produce a moving average 
measurement (Geltner and Miller, 2001, Clayton et al, 2001).  Seminal work by Quan and 
Quigley (1991) demonstrated that smoothed or lagging appraisals were a rational outcome 
of a thinly traded market.  They defined the optimal current appraisal (Vt) as being a 
function of a weighted average of current estimated market price (MPt -established from 
comparables) and the previous appraisal (Vt-1). A weighting factor (a) is applied to each 
variable and is a function of longitudinal variance (quantity of market movement from 
previous appraisal) and cross-sectional variance (quantity of uncertainty about reliability of 
comparable evidence).  This was more formally defined as  
 
 
Hence, it is demonstrated that at the level of the individual property, the incorporation of 
information from the previous appraisal will tend to improve the quality of the current 
appraisal1.  However, it is also recognised that this conceptualisation of the appraisal 
process is based on a rather narrow, mechanistic perspective of the appraisal task.  For 
instance, Brown and Matysiak (2000b) argue that the question of whether appraisers act in 
an optimal manner remains unanswered and that the key probably lies in studies of 
behaviour rather than economics.  Geltner (1998, 23) argues that “the most useful way to 
further our understanding of the appraisal smoothing issue is to pursue empirical analysis of 
commercial property markets”.   
 
There is an institutional background to these issues.  Crosby, Lavers and Murdoch (1998) 
argue that this background to the appraisal process in the UK, where appraisals have been 
increasingly challenged in the courts since the property market recession in 1990, reinforces 
the appraisers' reliance on actual comparable transaction information, thereby supporting the 
Quan and Quigley model. The appraiser's defence often relies on the expert evidence of 
other professional appraisers. It increases the appraiser's reluctance to move appraisals in 
the absence of hard transaction evidence, even though transactions may be scarce and out 
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of date, unless the other evidence is very compelling. Even then, adjustments will probably 
be conservative and given the circumstances this is rational behaviour. 
 
There is a considerable body of comment and investigation of the ‘smoothing’ effects of the 
use of appraisals in the measurement of property investment performance. Smoothing, in the 
context of appraisal-based property series, has been assumed to refer to an under-
measurement of ‘true’ variance.  Barkham and Geltner (1994, p92) define smoothing as 
"bias of time series second moments toward zero". Commonly observed statistical qualities 
of property return indices are: 
 
· relatively high and persistent levels of serial correlation positively linked to frequency of 
measurement; 
 
· relatively low levels of standard deviation; and 
 
· non-normality in returns with positive skewness. 
 
As well as under-measuring the extent of market change, it is generally held that appraisal-
based series fail to accurately record the timing of market movement.  In the price discovery 
literature, it has been consistently found that market change in securitised property 
investment provides a leading indicator of market change in unsecuritised markets.  
However, researchers have been cautious about concluding that there is a structural lead/lag 
relationship. It has been argued that there are strong grounds for concluding that a significant 
proportion of any lag is due to delayed recording of market change due to the use of 
appraisals (McAllister and Tarbert, 1998). In the appraisal accuracy literature, Matysiak 
and Wang (1995) look at the accuracy of appraisals in different market states and suggest 
that appraisals are higher (lower) than prices when markets are falling (rising).  This is 
consistent with studies in both the US and Australia (Webb, 1994; Newell and Kishore, 
1998). 
 
Given the centrality of appraisals to measurement of the investment performance of 
commercial property and the level of comment and analysis that their usage has generated, it 
is perhaps surprising that the process by and context in which appraisals are formed and 
how they are used has remained relatively under-researched.  Although appraiser behaviour 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
This approach, of course, assumes that a previous appraisal exists and that the appraiser is aware of it. 
In most periodic appraisals, the appraiser will be aware of the previous appraisals.  However, for 
valuations associated with loans or transactions, this may not be the case 
 
 
 6
has been used explicitly to explain these statistical qualities, there has been limited empirical 
investigation of the appraisal processes that may produce them.  Understanding processes is 
critical from the perspective of attempts to recover the ‘true’ underlying price series.  
Previous research suggests a number of appraiser traits which may produce the above 
 
(i) Following Quan and Quigley (1991), given ‘noisy’ transaction prices, appraisers 
partially adjust in response to new information.  This requires a negative 
contemporaneous cross-correlation between appraisal error and property true 
return 
 
(ii) Historic appraisals influence current appraisals through an ‘anchoring’ bias (see Diaz 
and Wolverton, 1998 and Clayton et al, 2001). 
 
(iii) Appraisal methodologies and institutional constraints drive appraisers towards 
requiring market transactions in order to change appraisals and, by definition, such 
transactions are historic and, consequently, produce a delay in recording market 
change or lagging.  At best, appraisers are slow to include non-transaction based 
information into appraisals. 
 
(iv) There are minimum thresholds which need to be breached before an appraisal is 
changed (see Brown and Matysiak, 2000a).  
 
The Quan-Quigley model implies negative contemporaneous cross-correlation between 
appraisal error and property true return.  Hence appraisers ‘under-react’ to market 
information.  It is recognised that appraisal smoothing is not constant and that the effects of 
(i) and (ii) will be time varying as the level of confidence in current market data and 
availability of information fluctuates. However, in certain circumstances there may be a 
positive contemporaneous cross-correlation between appraisal error and property true 
return.  There has been anecdotal evidence that clients can influence appraisers producing 
‘ramping’ of appraisals.  Hence ‘under-reaction’ and ‘over-reaction’ by appraisers may 
occur at the same time with the balance between their effects varying at different appraisal 
points. 
 
Graff and Webb (1997) identify agency costs as a source of significant serial persistence in 
the returns of individual properties.  They argue that this persistence reflects mis-pricing and 
mis-appraisal, arising from incentives (bonuses, fee structures) for managers to acquire 
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assets and to overbid for rarely available assets.  However, since the transaction price 
provides an “anchor” for subsequent appraisal,  
 
“the appraiser will need overwhelming and incontrovertible evidence that 
temporary/abnormal economic factors were involved in determining the sale price in order to 
produce an appraisal valuation that differs in a major way from that price” (Graff and Webb, 
1997, p. 21). 
 
Subsequent performance reflects the filtering through of the prior over/underpricing into the 
appraisal process.  Further in periodic performance appraisals, the fund manager is unable 
to observe the effort that goes into the appraisal service.  Any lack of movement in 
appraisals may partially reflect limited appraiser effort rather than poor information arrival, 
thin market effects etc. 
 
At the level of individual properties, it is now commonly accepted that appraisals are prone 
to uncertainty.  Whilst acknowledging important methodological limitations, empirical studies 
tend to confirm this view.  However, there has been little empirical investigation of how 
prices are formed in real estate markets and the role that appraisals may have in the price 
formation process.  In the appraisal accuracy literature, it has been pointed out that appraisal 
may sometimes be a self-fulfilling prophecy as market participants and intermediaries are 
influenced by historic appraisals in price determination2.  
 
A fundamental problem of the de-smoothing literature has been in judging the extent to 
which appraisal characteristics reflect the appraisal process rather than the inherent 
inefficiency in the market.  These points are not trivial if we wish to appreciate the 
characteristics of actual trading prices.  Geltner (1998) emphasises the difficulties of 
estimating true returns and the implied assumptions of ‘random walk’ behaviour in smoothing 
correction models.  It has been pointed out that appraisal-price anchoring may contribute to 
a process where actual trading prices actually display low volatility. MacGregor and 
Schwann (2000, p. 14) identify appraisal-price anchoring as a potential source of inertia 
arguing that 
 
 
 “where purchasers rely on appraisals to inform them about the market value of an asset, 
appraisal smoothing may result in sluggish price adjustment when market participants rely 
on appraisals to set their reservation prices”  
 
                                                                 
2  It is important not too overstate the significance of this phenomenon since, taken to its logical 
conclusion, it implies static markets.  However, in a market characterised by heterogeneity, thin 
trading, and poor information; it seems reasonable to postulate that a proportion of prices are 
biased by historic valuations. 
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In essence, sticky appraisals may produce sticky prices.  If it were correct that appraisals 
bias prices, it would suggest that price-based indices would display some of the same 
characteristics as appraisal-based series. 
  
Evidence from the capital markets provides further insights into the causes of low volatility 
and positive serial correlation.  Such characteristics tend to be associated with thinly traded 
markets.  In the secondary share market, where certain shares have low trading volumes 
due to limited information or high risk, it is well documented that the return series of such 
thinly traded investments display smoothing characteristics.  There are a number of 
interesting studies of the price behaviour of individual thinly traded stocks. For instance 
Kemp and Reid (1971) use actual share price movements for UK shares and find that thinly 
traded shares display non-random price changes. In a further study of UK share prices, 
Grimes and Benjamin (1975) found that only 30% of the sample behaved as genuine 
random walks, with 20% non-random walks and the remainder classified as inconclusive. 
The non-random walk results were mainly attributable to small relatively unmarketable 
stocks whereas the pure random walk results were generated from the share price series of 
large, well-traded companies.  
 
Moreover, recent research suggests that it is possible that the return series of the majority 
individual components of an aggregate return series may follow a random walk whilst 
displaying high levels of serial correlation.  A recent study by Huber (1997) suggests that 
thinness of markets contributes to rejection of the random walk hypothesis and also that the 
use of index data can cause rejection due to “contamination” by less frequently traded 
shares.   This idea has also been explored by Brown and Matysiak (2000a). They argue that 
smoothing arises from a proportion of appraisals which display “sticky prices” (nominal 
price rigidities).  Individual appraisals may be mainly random walks but a small proportion of 
sticky appraisals can cause the aggregated index to contain substantial serial correlation. 
Brown and Matysiak use an economic framework developed by Holbrook Working (1960) 
and demonstrate that the observed auto-correlation levels in property indices can arise from 
a “relatively small” number of sticky appraisals over time.  However, they adapt the 
Working (1960) approach to estimate that the observed levels of serial correlation in the 
IPD Monthly index.  Their results imply that 85% of appraisals are ‘sticky’ at a given 
measurement point in this monthly index.  
 
A further possible explanation is that observed auto-correlation in the index can arise from 
serial cross correlation which can be interpreted to mean that although prices may move 
individually in a random walk fashion, as a group all prices move in the same general 
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direction.  In simple terms, the individual appraisals are incorporating information efficiently, 
but because the market is incorporating information which is moving the market in a similar 
direction, individual appraisals are related to each other cross-sectionally. Thus, when these 
are added up in combination in the total returns series, this aggregates to appear as if high 
temporal auto-correlation is present.  Therefore, the auto-correlation is not coming from 
temporal appraisal smoothing at the individual property level, but rather from lagged 
aggregate cross-sectional effects. 
 
In summary, it is clear from the above discussion that appraisal-based performance series 
display the main characteristic associated with thinly traded markets – significant positive 
serial correlation.  It is equally clear that principal-agent problems inherent in the appraisal 
process have implications for appraisal behaviour.  The conjecture that the consequences for 
information arrival of thin trading are exacerbated by the behaviour of appraisers (and the 
institutional constraints influencing this behaviour) forms the context for the results of the 
investigation described below.   
 
This research set out to explore the appraisal formation process and the relationship 
between appraisals and prices and to examine the assortment of motivations, pressures and 
constraints shaping appraisal formation. 
 
The Interview Survey and Results 
 
The survey and interviewees 
In order to investigate the way in which appraisals are formed in the UK, a set of semi 
structured interview surveys were carried out. The main motivation for a qualitative research 
approach was that it permitted a more creative, exploratory and flexible style of research 
given that the initial research agenda was relatively broadly based. The approach is also 
based on a preconception that detailed knowledge of the research questions is situated with 
professionals and could be best accessed by personal interview or ‘close dialogue’ (Clark, 
1998).  However, it seems apposite to acknowledge the common criticisms of qualitative 
methodologies so that the key issue of validity is continually considered.  
 
There are risks inherent to a qualitative, interview-based, research methodologies which can 
lead to doubts about the rigour of the process and the validity of the results and conclusions.  
There has been considerable debate in the geography literature about approaches to 
qualitative research practices.  Criticisms have been raised concerning the lack of 
methodological rigour and transparency of qualitative research in social geography in terms 
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of the lack of explicit consideration of methodological issues in conducting the research and 
analysing the data (Baxter and Eyles, 1997).  The range of remedies for such limitations has 
been summarised as ‘grounded theory’.  In practical terms, the application of such theory 
focuses on increasing transparency about the research process, researcher reflexivity and 
data scepticism whilst applying more rigorous methods to the evaluation of data eg. 
triangulation.  Such methods have been applied in this study mainly by using multiple 
interviewers and by examining the research questions from the perspective of both 
‘consumers’ and ‘producers’. 
 
The first set of interviews were with leading property owning and fund management 
organisations in order to investigate their use of appraisals in property investment decisions. 
In order to reduce potential interviewer bias, one of the research team was present at all the 
interviews to ensure that a generally consistent line of investigation was followed. Where 
earlier interviews had raised interesting issues not previously considered by the research 
team, later interviews tended to be adapted to include a discussion of these matters.  The 
interview schedules used for the fund manager and appraisers were different but both 
consisted of a number of factual, closed-end and attitudinal open-ended questions. In total, 
20 interviews of fund managers were carried out during May and June, 1999. The size of 
sample reflected the relatively consolidated nature of the UK institutional property 
investment market and an intuitive guess at a figure that would be adequate.  No formal 
methodology was developed to identify potential interviewees. The person typically targeted 
was the senior fund manager or equivalent.  The sample can be characterised as self-
selecting and ‘convenient’ in that interviewees were identified from the researchers’ 
knowledge and experience (often personal) of important market participants in terms of 
organisation and their key personnel.  As a result interviews were sometimes between 
researchers and interviewees who had a pre-existing professional and friendly relationship3.  
 
The second set of interviews was carried out with representatives of the leading appraisal 
firms who were ‘producers’ of the appraisal services for fund management organisations. It 
was envisaged that interviewing the ‘producers’ would provide a fuller picture of the issues 
addressed as well as providing a check on the reliability and integrity of the data obtained 
from the fund managers.  However, the interview schedule had been refined in light of the 
findings of the previous set of interviews.  In total 11 interviews of heads of appraisal 
departments were carried out during June and July, 2000. The sample was smaller reflecting 
                                                                 
3  We have no reason to believe that this biased the data.  Given the sensitivity of the subject matter 
where client influence issues were also explored, this helped openness and in our opinion enhanced 
the information base.  We have observed no differences in response but where existing 
relationships existed, there does appear to be more information given.  
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revised perceptions of adequacy and the dominance of the sector by a small number of 
major providers. This is reflected in the fact that the vast majority of the Investment Property 
Databank Monthly Index is valued by very few firms, with over 60% by just three firms, see 
Table 1. 
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Table 1 : Proportion of IPD Monthly Valued by Largest 6 Firms – April 2001. 
Valuation Firm Capital value (£million) Percentage of Monthly 
Index 
1 2950.3 24.4 
2 2433.7 20.1 
3 2301.4 19.1 
4 1014.8 8.4 
5 943.8 7.8 
6 484.8 4.0 
Top Six Firms 10128.8 83.9 
Total of All Firms 12078.9 100.0 
Source : Investment Property Databank 
 
The annual index is not quite so dominated by the larger firms but the top five still value 
64.7% (Carsberg, 2002).  The 11 appraisers interviewed included 5 of the top six listed in 
Table 1 and a number of smaller firms undertaking the fund appraisals for only 2/3 funds. 
The 19 owner/manager organisations interviewed who answered the question on value and 
number of properties, held over 10,000 properties in their portfolios with a value of over 
£40 billion, which is just under half of the value of the IPD at that time.   But there is 
diversity between the interviewees in terms of fund size and value, allocation to property and 
type of organisation. The property companies had a 100% allocation to property while the 
funs had between 2% and 8%.  The split by property type was nearly 50% retail, 30% 
offices and 20% industrial but the range of allocations was between 95% and 10% for retail 
(standard deviation 16%), 65% and 3% for industrials (SD 13%) and 45% and 3% for 
offices (SD 10%). The average size of property funds managed by organisations was £2.12 
billion but this ranged from one fund of £10 billion to a fund of £360 million (SD £2.45 
billion).   Some respondents found the question too general since they were involved in 
managing a number of funds; each with different weightings.  
 
The survey results 
Reported below are the results of the research in terms of the main issues that emerged from 
the interviews4.   The main issues can be categorised into two parts of the fund management 
process where appraisals have a role; purchase/sale and periodic performance 
                                                                 
4  In discussing these issues, quotations from interviewees have been used.  However, the research 
interviews were not taped due to the sensitivity of the subject matter. The quotations are therefore 
transcribed from notes taken by one member of the team, who did not take an active part in the 
questioning. The quotations are of the main thrust of the point rather than the precise words in 
some cases. 
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measurement/financial statement.  Appraisals as security for loans are outside of the scope 
of this research. 
The use of appraisals in the transaction process 
Estimates of market (exchange) values and investment (intrinsic) values would be expected 
to be used in the transacting process as they would be in other markets.  In the UK, the 
distinction between appraisals to identify market value and appraisals to identify the 
investment values is fully documented in both the academic and professional literature; 
indeed it is formally institutionalised by definitions of both Market Value and Calculation of 
Worth appearing in the UK mandatory appraisal  manual (RICS, 1995).  The 
owner/manager interviewees virtually all suggested that they carry out estimates of 
investment value for any property to be sold or purchased and any mismatch with market 
value may be used to influence buy/sell decisions.   
 
When purchasing, funds usually obtain a purchase report which includes a market appraisal.  
Controversially, this report is often obtained from the firm introducing the property, whose 
fee is dependent upon the transaction taking place.  The fund manager also normally takes 
advice from the portfolio appraiser who will be undertaking the periodic performance 
measurement appraisal.  It is possible that the portfolio appraiser also works in the same 
firm as the introducing agent.   Setting aside the conflict of interest and moral hazard issues 
which arise from this situation, which will be the subject of another paper, the purchaser 
normally has access to three appraisals, an internal assessment of investment, a purchase 
report which includes a market value and an opinion from the portfolio appraiser of whether 
the proposed purchase price will be supported at the next re-appraisal 5.    
 
“An informal valuation is usually acquired for advice purposes prior to 
negotiation.  This is particularly important for funds who don’t want the 
property to be written down so they take a performance hit” 
 
Despite previous anecdotal practitioner comment that a market value from the portfolio 
appraiser which did not confirm the purchase price was instrumental in stopping transactions 
taking place, the research found that very few fund managers felt so constrained.  They were 
confident that their appraisal of investment value would prove correct, that the price levels in 
the sub-market would adjust to the mismatch that they had isolated and that the appraisers 
would probably change their mind anyway given the importance of transaction evidence to 
market appraisals. The appraiser interviews confirmed many previous findings that the UK 
                                                                 
5  The appraisal from the portfolio appraiser may be restricted in that it is a ‘desk-top’ appraisal 
undertaken using information supplied by the client.  This may raise questions of liability and this 
issue of status is the subject of an on-going funded research project.  
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market appraisal process is still dominated by capitalisation rate comparables rather than 
any explicit DCF methodology.  Purchasers are therefore driven by estimates of investment 
value rather than market value. 
 
Typical quotes were: 
 
“The company will buy property at a price above independent valuation even 
for unit linked funds.” 
 
“There has never been a problem taking a performance hit as deals are made 
with an horizon of 3-5 years.” 
 
But not all funds are immune. 
 
“The trustees like the price to be underwritten and presentation to the board 
would not be given without this.” 
 
The attitudes of funds when selling are markedly different.  Market appraisals played a much 
more significant role in determining asking prices and therefore affect which properties were 
eventually sold. Every fund has the last periodic market appraisal ‘in the books’ and selling 
below this figure is often difficult.  There were basically two types of investor attitude 
towards an appraisal/price mismatch – ‘appraisal-constrained’ investors and ‘appraisal-
independent’ investors.    For a small majority of fund managers interviewed, a market price 
below a prior appraisal indicated a ‘low’ price at which they could not trade.  Often a 
threshold was present at which non-trading would occur, typically if the price diverged from 
the prior appraisal by more that 5%.  The main reasons that selling at a price below latest 
appraisal was problematic related to obtaining necessary authorisation from trustees and 
other executive bodies.  It was also stated that such a situation could potentially undermine 
confidence in periodic performance measures based on appraisals of the remainder of the 
portfolio.  
 
 Actual quotes were: 
 
“To sell 3-5% below the valuation is ok.  It is rare to sell any more below” 
 
“Worth is the true indicator of whether a sale should go ahead, not valuation.  
However, it is uncomfortable to go below valuation” 
 
 “As this fund is successful it doesn’t matter if it takes a hit on acquisition or 
sale.  However, it is difficult to sell below 5-10% of the valuation.” 
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 “If valuation is not a reflection of current price then it can be difficult to sell”  
 
“If the sale price is lower than 10% below valuation it throws into question 
the valuation of all other assets.  It is a psychological barrier” 
 
“If the worth and valuation calculations don’t agree then this might cause 
problems” 
 
However, for others investors, essentially the problem was perceived as a ‘high’ appraisal.  
As a result a mismatch between the price and appraisal would not result in an aborted 
transaction.   
 
“There is no problem selling below book value” 
 
 “There is no difficulty in selling below valuation” 
 
 “The valuer may influence but would not stop the deal.  Renegotiations of the 
deal and with the valuer may occur” 
 
“The company will sell below valuation with no problem” 
 
“If the sale is going to be below valuation it will be examined closely as it will 
mean a performance hit but if that property is going to drag your performance 
down anyway then it is worth selling” 
  
Interviews with appraisers generally confirmed the importance of prior periodic appraisals in 
the disposal process.  It was stated on a number of occasions that sales were more likely to 
be affected by failure to match a previous performance appraisal.  Confirming the findings 
with the fund managers, a significant proportion of vendors feel unable to sell below ‘book 
value’6.   These findings support the Schwann-MacGregor argument that trading prices are 
biased by previous appraisals and consequently, may have the same time series qualities as 
appraisal series. 
 
This finding has important implications for research issues other than the way in which 
appraisals and prices are formed.  First, the need to match previous appraisal on sale within 
some funds opens up client influence issues.  A fund manager may be tempted to try and get 
the appraisal down so that any subsequent transaction can be negotiated off a lower base.  
If trustees do not like selling at below appraisal they may be equally pleased to sell above 
appraisal, to the benefit of trustee/manager relations.  Second, the validity of appraisal 
accuracy studies which compare sales with previous transactions is brought into question.  
                                                                 
6  In this context, book value refers to the most recent performance appraisal. 
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This research implies that the samples used are biased towards situations where the prices 
achieved exceeded previous appraisal. Interpretations of the accuracy data need re-visiting 
in the light of these findings.  Both these issues are being developed in other papers.  
Further, it raises fundamental questions about the attraction of transaction-based indices.  
The findings suggest that transaction prices reflect a biased sample of transaction prices.  
This occurs for two reasons.  Firstly, as noted above, prices are contaminated by appraisals.  
Secondly, and more importantly, there is selection bias problem since this evidence implies 
that transaction prices below prior appraisals would be systematically under-represented7.    
 
The periodic appraisal process 
In terms of process, the main issue addressed was standard practice in terms of information 
research, timing and client consultation.   
 
In terms of levels of effort and research it was clear that levels of research varied with time 
period. The research did not investigate the contracts between appraiser and client so 
cannot comment fully on how much these differences were part of the contract or related to 
different firms’ standard practice.  But the appraisers did differ in the level of input into the 
appraisal process.  While most suggested that the annual appraisal was very fully 
researched, the input into monthly and quarterly appraisals was more variable.  For 
example, some of the larger firms suggested that information on rental values and yields was 
updated every month while others suggested this process only occurred every three months.  
The comments below give the range of input and the variation between firms. 
 
“The six monthly valuation is a review” 
 
“Every quarter the properties are marked to market yield with the advice of 
an investment colleague…A full ring round for comparables is done every 
quarter” 
 
“Monthly meetings are held with the investment team to discuss, sentiment, 
yields and rentals” 
 
For monthly valuations “they will not run the numbers on every 
property…For quarterly valuations the valuer will do more” 
 
“Each property is thought about…Monthlys are incredibly difficult to do” 
 
                                                                 
7 This may well explain why unpublished research by IPD in the UK using actual transaction prices to 
produce an investment performance index display higher levels of serial correlation that appraisal-based 
indices 
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“When producing monthly valuations, it is generally a waste of time to look at 
rental values.  This is done every three months…the investment market is 
considered in detail every three months”    
 
Most appraiser respondents8 expressed scepticism of the utility of monthly appraisals given 
limited information flows in the property market.  There is pressure within the UK investment 
community to move to quarterly appraisals for the whole of the Investment Property 
Databank universe and there is little doubt that the major firms are already undertaking a 
major audit of market information every quarter at present.  Monthly appraisals are not 
subject to this level of research and a complete re-running of the information through 
appraisal computer systems is not carried out. 
 
Another aspect of the provision of appraisals is the change in the market structure of 
appraisal providers.  Table 1 illustrated that the monthly appraisals are predominantly in the 
hands of very few firms.  The interviewees all confirmed that this trend towards  
concentration was continuing fuelled by the squeeze on fees.  A number of smaller appraisal 
firms were disengaging from appraisals to concentrate on providing other more profitable 
services to clients.  The move towards independent appraisers combined with continuing fee 
level competition could see the top three firms utilising economies of scale to dominate 
periodic appraisal provision.  There are a number of implications of this, not least that the 
indices will come to be dominated by the opinions of a few very influential appraisers.  The 
way in which these appraisers approach appraisals and how they interact with clients will 
influence the shape of performance. 
 
Client/appraiser consultation is very full in the UK market and it is common practice, similar 
to the findings of Schuck and Levy (1999) in New Zealand, to have a draft appraisal 
meeting between the client and the appraiser for virtually all appraisals regardless of whether 
annual, quarterly or monthly.  These meetings enable the appraiser to present their suggested 
appraisals and the client to inform the appraisal with additional information from their more 
detailed knowledge of the property.  The client influence implications of these meetings are 
investigated elsewhere but there is a general view from both sets of respondents that, despite 
the concerns, draft appraisal meetings enhance the appraisal process through better 
information flows. 
 
The timing of the draft meeting was in the month before the appraisal date for 
monthly/quarterly appraisals but for annual appraisals in often took place earlier, in 
                                                                 
8   A single contrary view that the monthly appraisal was just as accurate as the annual was expressed. 
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November/early December for the December year end.  Typically, most draft appraisal 
meetings with the client took place in early December with some clients requesting figures as 
early as October.  The November monthly appraisal may be subject to a greater level of 
consultation and information than other monthly appraisals while December has the greatest 
level of effort expended.   
 
As indicated earlier, it was clear from discussions that the use of a traditional comparative 
investment method of appraisal was almost universal.  Where there was a perceived lack of 
‘hard’ transaction information in the property market, an interesting and clear difference of 
opinion among appraisers regarding the information required to change appraisals emerged.  
In effect, some respondents felt that they could not move their appraisals without transaction 
evidence, whilst others felt that changes in market sentiment should be reflected.  However, 
the latter also pointed out the difficulties of estimating the timing and level of basically 
subjective adjustments. 
 
“Transactions that fall through are not market movement.  If there is no 
evidence of a falling market you cannot mark down values.  You cannot reflect 
movement in other markets”  
 
“Monthly valuations ultimately have to move but generally stay stable 
through lack of volume of evidence” 
 
“Monthly valuations involve picking up the local market information and then 
tweaking the valuations” 
 
“Often values do not drop in the month that reflects the drop.  The change 
crystallises in the month that it was not necessarily initiated in” 
 
Valuations will move to wider market movement, not necessarily only 
provable movement.  The valuers listen to their investment colleagues” 
 
“Monthly valuations often miss sentiment cues” 
 
For monthly valuations, sentiment builds up over two to three months and 
then is crystallised in the market.  The question rests on where you start 
reflecting sentiment rather than reality?” 
 
“I am known as a volatile valuer…I do not wait for cast iron evidence” 
 
An interesting and illuminating case study raised initially by interviewees and (then in 
subsequent interviews by) interviewers was the implications of thin trading for property 
appraisers in ‘stalled’ markets.  This was apparent in the aftermath of the Russian debt crisis 
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of 1998.  During October-December of that year, uncertainty about the prospects for the 
global economy and the property market led to changes in investor sentiment towards 
commercial property.  This was manifested in a decline in transactions due to changing 
expectations, a lack of buyers and a number of aborted transactions.  Many respondents 
believed that there had been a definite decline in values which, in the absence of adequate 
trading volume, could not be proven by actual transaction evidence. In terms of the response 
of fund appraisers, reactions were mixed; some stated that they adjusted appraisals after a 
delay, whilst others tended to ‘sit it out’ and wait until evidence appeared.  In the event, 
around 80% of IPD monthly appraisals remained unchanged in October 1998 and the 
capital growth index fell by -0.27%.   On average 69% of appraisals remain unchanged 
each month and the average capital value change is 0.68% ignoring whether it is up or 
down.  In November, around 70% remained unchanged, but 20% of the 30% which moved 
went down.  This appears to suggest that the appraisals froze for the first month and were 
then reduced a month later. 
 
This matches with the evidence from discussions with appraisers.  It suggests that they 
follow a number of strategies when faced with a lack of data supporting market change. 
 
§ No adjustment. 
§ Delayed adjustment. 
§ Conservative adjustment. 
 
Moreover, a number of appraisers pointed out (without a specific question) that their clients 
preferred a slow adjustment in appraisals and were wary of volatility.  Some respondents 
suggested that in declining markets, some fund managers wished the decline in values be 
‘managed’ rather than taking place in the period that it occurred. The potential of anchoring 
to exacerbate these effects was also established. It was confirmed that the same appraiser 
normally valued the portfolio and was (obviously) aware of previous appraisals.  
Interestingly, two respondents stated that, in order to reduce the inevitable repetitiveness 
associated with the appraisal of a single portfolio, they had experimented with revolving the 
portfolios between different internal individual appraisers.  However, the experiment was not 
sustained due to the subsequent increased volatility that resulted. 
 
It is stressed that these observations are not universal amongst either appraisers or fund 
managers.  However, they do seem to reflect the behaviour of some fund managers and 
appraisers in specific market circumstances.  In falling markets, in particular, lack of 
transaction evidence reduces information flows.  However, the appraisers are selective in 
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their information choice.  Evidence of changing sentiment and the performance of the public 
markets seem to be filtered out of the appraisal process. However, this problem is almost 
certainly exacerbated by the behaviour of a proportion of fund managers who have 
incentives to influence their appraisers.  As indicated earlier, these issues are developed 
elsewhere. 
 
Appraisal Movements in the IPD Monthly Index 
 
The discussion in the previous section leads to a number of observations about how 
frequently undertaken performance measurement appraisals may behave. As indicated 
previously, there is a well-developed literature on the appraisal process, in particular the 
approach of appraisers adopting comparable sales techniques for periodic appraisals.  Quan 
and Quigley (1989, 1991) demonstrate that an optimal strategy for the appraiser is to 
determine the weighted average of the previous appraisal and new transaction information. 
The qualitative research discussed above suggests that the appraisal formation process is 
more complex with the timing of the appraisal, the terms of the appraisal ‘contract’ and the 
traits of the particular client and appraiser influencing appraisal outcomes.  Indeed, it has 
been noted that Brown and Matysiak use backward iteration to predict very high 
proportions of ‘sticky’ appraisals in monthly indices. 
 
The level of anchoring would be a function of the arrival of new information.  However, it 
was clear from the interviews that the appraisers did not spread their ‘search’ for 
information equally.  A number of appraisers indicated that they carried out more market 
analysis for the quarter day appraisals of March, June, September and December than at the 
other months, so less anchoring may be expected at each quarter day.  However, there is 
also evidence of some structural inertia in the process. In the UK it is normal practice is for 
purchaser’s costs to be deducted from a ‘gross of transaction costs’ appraisal.  One of the 
costs is transfer tax (known as Stamp Duty in the UK).  After a long period of stability, 
Stamp Duty rose three times following a change of government in the UK; March 1999 and 
1998 and July 1997.  All (most) appraisals would be expected to change if the deduction 
was increased in those months. 
 
In order to identify whether any of these effects are observable, the IPD Monthly index from 
January 1987 to April 2001 was examined for the number of appraisals which remain 
unchanged each month.  Figure 2 illustrates that on average the proportion of appraisals that 
remain unchanged month to month over the whole term of the index averages 69%.  This is 
consistent with the prediction of Brown and Matysiak.  Figure 2 illustrates how this varies 
with the (absolute) level of market movement.  Not unexpectedly, there is a strong negative 
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correlation (-0.78) between the two time series. There are periods when the number of 
appraisals remaining unchanged was relatively low, most noticeably in the ‘hot market’ of 
the late 1980s and in the recovery of 1993/4.  However, almost invariably, the majority of 
appraisals each month remain unchanged throughout the period. 
 
Figure 1 : Absolute capital growth 1986-2001 
Figure 2 : IPD Monthly Index – Unchanged Appraisals Jan 1987 to April 2001 
 
 
Months when appraisals seemed to move more than others include the three increases in 
Stamp Duty.   Although more appraisals than usual change at the first appraisal date after a 
Stamp Duty increase or decrease is implemented, it is also interesting that a number of 
appraisals (or appraisers) simply failed to react. 
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Table 2 sets out the average number of appraisals that produce an increase in value, a 
decrease and stay the same in each particular month over the term of the index and they are 
illustrated in Figure 3.  This shows that the months with the greatest change are quarter days.  
December and March are tied into the annual appraisals of institutional investors 
(December) and listed property companies (March).  November is also a relatively high 
change month which again fits the hypothesis that appraisals change due to more information 
being available (or discovered) because of the work being undertaken for the December 
appraisals.  December does not have the greatest number of increased appraisals, this 
occurs in June with December a close second.  March November and December have the 
highest number of decreasing appraisals; this might be consistent with the influence that 
potential sales have on year-end appraisals.  
 
Table 2 : Average Change in Monthly Appraisals – IPD Jan 1987 to April 2001  
 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Ave 
Average of 
% Same 
74.1% 70.9% 67.3% 70.2% 69.1% 65.9% 68.5% 72.5% 67.4% 69.3% 67.2% 65.0% 69.0% 
Average 
% 
Increas e 
15.0% 16.8% 18.6% 17.7% 18.9% 21.3% 17.7% 16.4% 19.4% 17.7% 18.8% 21.0% 18.2% 
Average 
% 
Decrease 
10.9% 12.3% 14.1% 12.1% 12.0% 12.8% 13.8% 11.2% 13.2% 13.0% 14.0% 14.0% 12.8% 
 
 
Figure 2  : Average % of Appraisals Changed in Monthly Appraisals – IPD Jan 
1987 to April 2001  
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Relative differences are very small and as Figure 2 shows hardly distinguishable. However, 
Figure 3 does confirm that there is a pattern concerning the movement of appraisals which 
relates to the annual, half yearly and quarterly appraisals.  
Figure 3 : No of Appraisals Changed/Unchanged Compared to Average No. of 
Appraisals Changed/Unchanged 
Monthly Valuation Inertia
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Ignoring any additional issues concerning client influence, the number of appraisals which 
move could be hypothesised to be based upon what happened in the previous month.  The 
smoothing of the monthly index indicates that the total returns for the month are a function of 
the returns in the previous month.  As total return is a function of the income return plus the 
capital growth, capital growth would also be expected to be a function of previous month’s 
capital growth.  The correlation coefficient for the relationship between capital growth and 
the previous month’s capital growth in the IPD monthly from Feb 1987 to April 2001 is 
0.89.  As capital growth is a function of the change in appraisals, the amount of appraisal 
change in a month is likely to be linked to the level of capital growth or fall.  Where values 
are rising steeply, the appraiser will change the appraisals each month, but may implement 
the change spread over a few months especially if waiting for ‘hard’ transaction evidence.  A 
high level of change in one month may lead to a high level of change in the next month 
therefore the number of appraisals which change will be related to the number changed last 
month and the level of capital gain last month.  The level of absolute change in capital gain 
will be the crucial element, as a high level of change in appraisals will be linked to falling as 
well as rising markets, with falls introduced incrementally over a few months. 
 
The output of the statistical analysis is set out in Table 3 based upon the hypothesis that the 
number of appraisals changed will be based upon the number of appraisals changed in the 
previous month and the absolute level of capital growth in the index in the previous month.  
In addition the quarter day appraisals appear to have more input in terms of effort and 
information so these appraisals would be expected to be significant in increasing the number 
of appraisals changed.  The three budget change months may also be a factor so these two 
elements are introduced as dummy variables.  The variables are:  
 
· The level of absolute capital growth (in a rapidly rising or falling market the number of 
appraisals which are static will fall) in the previous month. 
· Whether it is a quarter day (QT dummy). 
· The level of static appraisals in the previous month. 
· Whether it is a budget month or not? (Budget dummy). 
 
 
Table 3 : Regression Statistics       
Multiple R 0.832 ANOVA      
R Square 0.692  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
Adjusted R Square 0.685 Regression 4 1.0213 0.2553 93.2322 0.0000 
Standard Error 0.052 Residual 166 0.4546 0.0027   
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Observations 171 Total 170 1.4759    
        
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95%  
Intercept 0.1242 0.0178 6.9709 0.0000 0.0890 0.1594  
Abs cap growth lagged 0.0610 0.0112 5.4229 0.0000 0.0388 0.0832  
% moved lagged 0.4068 0.0706 5.7604 0.0000 0.2674 0.5462  
QT Dum 0.0447 0.0086 5.1723 0.0000 0.0276 0.0617  
Budget Dum 0.2491 0.0307 8.1171 0.0000 0.1885 0.3097  
 
Table 3 illustrates that all the variables are significant at the 1% level including the two 
dummies for the budget day and the quarter day appraisal.  The budget day increases the 
number of appraisals which move by 25% and upon quarter days around 4.5% more 
appraisals move.   
 
The analysis suggests that there is a process effect. The quarter day appraisals have 
significantly more movement than other months.  In addition a number of other months are 
significant.  In Table 4 the QT dummy is removed and each month is included separately. 
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Table 4 : Regression Statistics       
Multiple R 0.878 ANOVA      
R Square 0.771   df SS MS F Significance F
Adjusted R Square 0.750 Regression 14.0000 1.1379 0.0813 37.5093 0.0000 
Standard Error 0.047 Residual 156.0000 0.3380 0.0022   
Observations 171 Total 170.0000 1.4759       
        
  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95%Upper 95%   
Intercept 0.1017 0.0189 5.3711 0.0000 0.0643 0.1391  
Abs cap growth lagged 0.0580 0.0102 5.6887 0.0000 0.0379 0.0782  
% moved lagged 0.4817 0.0658 7.3211 0.0000 0.3517 0.6117  
Budget Dum 0.2603 0.0285 9.1304 0.0000 0.2040 0.3166  
Jan -0.0783 0.0193 -4.0606 0.0001 -0.1165 -0.0402  
Feb 0.0441 0.0187 2.3611 0.0195 0.0072 0.0810  
Mar 0.0416 0.0187 2.2297 0.0272 0.0047 0.0785  
Apr -0.0205 0.0188 -1.0857 0.2793 -0.0577 0.0168  
May 0.0274 0.0186 1.4696 0.1437 -0.0094 0.0641  
Jun 0.0539 0.0186 2.8928 0.0044 0.0171 0.0907  
Aug -0.0209 0.0186 -1.1243 0.2626 -0.0577 0.0158  
Sept 0.0634 0.0191 3.3201 0.0011 0.0257 0.1011  
Oct 0.0065 0.0190 0.3439 0.7314 -0.0310 0.0441  
Nov 0.0490 0.0187 2.6135 0.0098 0.0120 0.0860  
Dec 0.0477 0.0159 3.0077 0.0031 0.0164 0.0790   
 
In addition to significantly positive coefficients for the quarter day appraisals, November also 
has a significant positive coefficient.  This follows the information flow argument and the 
finding that the additional effort that goes into end of year appraisals produces additional 
movement.  In addition, the seasonal “holiday” of January has a significantly negative 
coefficient. The presence of significantly more appraisals moving in February is the most 
unexpected result.  But one of the factors in the model is the level of movement in appraisals 
in the previous month.  The additional movement in February over and above that expected 
is a product of the lagged relationship with the lack of movement in January.  Although a low 
number of appraisals change in February, the expectation is even less should change given 
February follows January.   
 
Implications and Conclusions 
 
This research suggests perceived limitations and characteristics of appraisal-based 
investment performance indices can be partly attributed to the nature and context of the 
appraisal process.  Given the crucial lack of trading volume, the research suggests that a 
significant proportion of appraisals remain sticky due to a combination of lack of information 
arrival, a lack of search for this information and the institutional context of appraisals. 
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The research supports the view that the methodological and institutional stress on transaction 
evidence restricts the ability of appraisals to react to other types of price-sensitive 
information.  This, in turn, affects price determination since it is clear that the price 
determination process of a significant proportion of investors is influenced by historic 
appraisals. However, it is important to re-iterate that there are notable variations in the 
conduct of the ‘actors’.  For instance, it is clear that a section of appraisers are responsive 
(to some degree) to price-sensitive issues apart from transaction evidence and a section of 
investors are relatively unconstrained by historic appraisals.  
 
Given that this variation of approach exists, concentration of appraisals in the hands of fewer 
appraisers does raise questions and some were addressed by the recent Carsberg 
Committee report published by the RICS in the UK (Carsberg, 2002).  The structure of 
appraisal providers and the client/appraiser relationship were significant issues according to 
Carsberg and the RICS has been recommended to start detailed monitoring of the process 
and the results of performance measurement appraisals. 
 
Work on the effect of market microstructures identifies the potential effect of trading 
mechanisms on prices and the time series properties of prices.  This study of market 
participant behaviour suggests that, as expected, appraisals and market prices are inter-
twined.  This is not a problem but research which assumes that they are independent of each 
other is overly simplistic. It is not necessarily the case that transaction prices should exhibit 
the characteristics of a stochastic process or are similar to the patterns commonly produced 
by a Stock Exchange trading environment.  There are institutional structures linking 
appraisals to the mechanics of the price formation process.  Negotiated transactions rely on 
appraisals to act as a basis for offers/asking prices and they also act in some type of 
‘confirmatory’ capacity for transaction approval.  More importantly, for a significant 
proportion of investors, historic appraisals often provide a ‘floor’ below which they cannot 
sell.  Therefore, observed prices are likely to be ‘smoothed’ to some degree by the same 
forces as appraisals.  Such structural price ‘smoothing’ is a product of the trading 
environment.  
 
The empirical study of the IPD monthly index finds that the appraisal process produces 
variation in the level of appraisals, with annual appraisals being more responsive to change 
than quarterly appraisals, which in turn are more responsive than monthly appraisals.  This is 
not an unexpected finding.  It confirms that the level of information and input varies.  
However, it does not suggest that the quality of the appraisals reduces as the frequency 
increases.  With the push for quarterly appraisals within the UK investment community and a 
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planned implementation within the next few years, the research highlights the trade off 
between cost, quality and frequency.  If investors wish to increase the frequency but also 
keep costs down, the reaction of the appraisers will be to undertake appraisals on restricted 
information and input.  If the move to quarterly appraisals is to improve property market 
information, then the objective appears to be put at risk.  Quarterly appraisals could be the 
catalyst for improving appraisal quality but the collection of information and the interpretation 
of that information have a cost attached. 
 
This paper has looked at the appraisal process issues and has purposefully ignored the 
relationship between the fund manager/owner and the appraiser.  This may impact on the 
findings as any client influence may change values and influence the number of appraisals that 
change in the data analysed for this paper. The contrast between  appraisal movement in 
January and December may not be solely due to process and information flows. The client / 
appraiser relationship is the subject of another paper in course of preparation and therefore 
the conclusions of this paper may be subject to amendment when that work is completed. 
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